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Many decision makers seek to optimize choices between uncertain options such as strategies, employees,or products. When performance targets must be met, attending to observed past performance is not
enough to optimize choices—option uncertainty must also be considered. For example, for stretch targets that
exceed observed performance, more uncertain options are often better bets. A significant determinant of option
uncertainty is sample size: for a given option, the smaller the sample of information we have about it, the
greater the uncertainty. In two studies, choices were made between pairs of uncertain options with the goal
of exceeding a specified performance target. Information about the options differed in the size of the sample
drawn from them, sample size, and the observed performance of those samples, the proportion of successes or
“hits” in the sample. We found people to be sensitive to sample size–based uncertainty only when differences in
observed performance were negligible. We conclude that in the presence of performance targets, people largely
fail to capitalize on the value advantages of small samples in the presence of stretch targets.
Keywords : optimal foraging theory; small sample advantage; Bayesian rationality; bounded rationality;
less-is-more; sampling approach; convexity; expected utility
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Introduction
Imagine a bettor deciding which of two horses to bet
on in the next race, a major event attracting the top
stables and riders. Both horses are long shots. The
bettor knows that Derring Do has come as high as
third in his last 20 races but has never come first. So
Derring Do is certainly above average but is probably
not a race winner. For Dark Knocks, the bettor only
knows about one race, where the horse came sixth. It
is likely that Derring Do will outpace Dark Knocks.
But is Derring Do the best bet, when the “best bet”
does not mean choosing the one who will likely out-
perform the other, but rather the one more likely to do
outstandingly well and come first in a highly compet-
itive race? Because there is so little information about
Dark Knocks, it remains possible that Dark Knocks is
actually a race-winning horse that had just one not-
so-great race. Imagine, as well, an analogous hiring
decision. Two applicants are interviewing for a posi-
tion. Both have graduated with honors from a top
institution. Candidate A has been in the workplace for
some time and has proven to be a sterling employee,
performing significantly better than the typical hon-
ors graduate from that institution; candidate B is a
fresh graduate. Yet the firm in question is looking
for the very best, meaning employees who will be
in the top 1%. Who should the firm hire if it must
choose between these two? The interviewers have lots
of information about candidate A and so can be sure
she is above average but not absolutely outstanding.
Candidate B is an unknown. On average, candidate A
will be better, but candidate B is the only candidate
who could be a top 1% performer.
These decisions share two key features. First, the
target for acceptable performance is a stretch target,
meaning it exceeds the average or expected level
for both options. And, second, the decision maker
has more information about the performance of one
of the options. In both cases it is likely the low-
information option is the one to go with, because of
and not in spite of that lack of information. The
bettor and the employer can be all but certain that
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the high-information option (Derring Do and candi-
date A) will not meet the stretch target, but they can
reasonably hope the low-information one might.
When seeking merely acceptable performers the
tables are turned. If the observed performance of
both options is above a target, that is when dealing
with a below-average target, then greater uncertainty
increases chances to fail. In the hiring example,
if an average employee is needed, then the well-
established employee is almost certain to meet the
bill. The untested employee could still prove a disas-
ter. Additionally, for both stretch and below-average
targets, option uncertainty can compensate for lower
observed performance. For stretch targets, lower
observed performance can be compensated for by
greater uncertainty, as we suggested for Dark Knocks,
whereas for below-average targets, it can be compen-
sated for by lower uncertainty. Appendix A provides
an illustration and computational details.
In this paper we investigate peoples’ sensitivity to
amount of information when making choices under
uncertainty in the presence of performance targets.
We ask whether, for options having comparable sam-
ple performance, people will favor high-information
options when facing below-average targets and low-
information options when facing stretch targets. We
also ask whether variations in uncertainty can be
traded off against lower sample performance. We
investigate settings in which people receive large or
small samples about pairs of options. Each option is
an outcome-generating process (analogous to horses
or job candidates), and respondents must choose one
option to attempt to reach or exceed a performance
target. We find that people are sensitive to sample
size–based uncertainty, but only when the options do
not differ in observed sample performance.
Background
Our analysis is conditioned on the presence of a
target for performance. The importance of targets,
under names such as criterion values, aspiration lev-
els, goals, or reference points, is widely recognized
by researchers in the social and behavioral sciences
(Markowitz 1952, Fishburn 1977, Heath et al. 1999,
Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Lopes 1981, Payne et al.
1980, Simon 1955). Daniel Bernoulli (Bernoulli 1954,
p. 25) used the concept of a target to qualify his
assumption that utility was a nonlinear function of
wealth, when he proposed that “a rich prisoner who
possesses two thousand ducats but needs two thou-
sand ducats more to repurchase his freedom will
place a higher value on a gain of two thousand ducats
than does another man who has less money than he.”
Even more, this prisoner will assign essentially zero
utility to anything less than 2,000 ducats and rela-
tively little additional utility to anything more. As in
this most clear-cut case, targets describe a binary func-
tional relation between the level on a performance
dimension such as money and the value of that level.
The idea that in the presence of a stretch target
an option’s value might be increasing in uncertainty
has been considered in many domains. In hiring,
uncertainty about an applicant’s true performance has
been associated with risk premia (Lazear 1995). Young
workers might be appealing because there is still lit-
tle information about performance and so they have
a chance of being exceptional performers. Similarly,
in human mate selection, a lack of mutual knowledge
seems responsible for inflated impressions of mutual
attractiveness (Norton et al. 2007). If finding an ideal
mate represents a stretch target, when there is little
information there is a chance that “this is the one,”
whereas with more knowledge usually comes the cer-
tainty that he or she is not. Finally, in foraging, there is
evidence that animals prefer more uncertain options
when less uncertain options are unlikely to cover their
daily energy targets (Kacelnik and Bateson 1996).
Evidence suggests that choices are at least par-
tially sensitive to these implications of uncertainty.
Rode et al. (1999) conducted a study in the context of
balls and urns. Respondents chose whether to draw
from a “risky” urn having a known number of black
and white balls or a maximally “uncertain urn” with
no information about its composition. When striving
for a stretch target, people preferred to draw from
the uncertain urn, but when the target was average
or below average, they preferred the risky urn. For
example, in one condition the expected proportion
was 50% black balls in both urns, and the target was
6 or 7 blacks in 10 draws. Nearly 60% of participants
chose the uncertain urn. With a below-average tar-
get (3 or 4 blacks from 10 draws), 95% preferred the
known option.
Heath et al. (1999) investigated a more concrete con-
text. They gave participants either a stretch target for
cost reduction (save $250,000) or asked them to save
“as much as possible.” Respondents chose between a
cost reduction plan offering a moderate sure result,
saving $80,000 for sure, or a plan that offered a higher
but more risky result and a lower average, 20% chance
of $250,000, and $50,000 otherwise. Only 24% of par-
ticipants chose the risky plan, trying to save as much
as possible. This increased to 47% when they had the
stretch target. Hence, there is evidence that people are
at least partially sensitive to the value of uncertainty
when reaching for stretch targets.
In this paper we seek to generalize this evidence
in the context of an additional source of uncertainty,
the amount of sample information available about
the options. If we hold the sampling method con-
stant, larger samples produce more certainty about
the properties of a population. This principle was
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formulated as the law of large numbers by Jakob
Bernoulli. In 1713, Bernoulli also made the psycho-
logical claim that “even the stupidest man [under-
stands the law of large numbers], by some instinct
of nature per se and by no previous instruction” (as
translated by Sung 1966, p. 23, italics in original). Evi-
dence supports his view. For example, when judg-
ing group differences, confidence and extremity of
judgments increase with sample size (Irwin et al.
1956, Obrecht and Chesney 2013). And, supporting
Bernoulli’s nativism, this tendency emerges early in
development (Jacobs and Narloch 2001, Masnick and
Morris 2008).
Yet when presented in combination with sample
proportions, people underappreciate the greater pre-
cision of large samples. Griffin and Tversky (1992)
illustrated this in a number of studies showing that
what they called evidence “strength,” i.e., the sam-
ple proportion, was given much more importance
in evaluating the truth of hypotheses than evidence
“weight,” i.e., sample size. For example, they asked
participants to report their confidence that a coin
was biased at a ratio of 3 to 2. Confidence increased
strongly when a skewed sample proportion changed
the posterior probability in favor of the bias but only
weakly when the same change in posterior probabil-
ity was brought about by a change in sample size
(see also Antoniou et al. 2014, Obrecht et al. 2007).
These and other studies on making inferences from
samples of different sizes suggest that although sam-
ple size is not completely neglected, it is significantly
underweighted (see also Bar-Hillel 1979, Evans and
Dusoir 1977, Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer 1997, Peterson
et al. 1968).
Combining these strands of research showing that
people often choose uncertain options when reaching
for stretch targets, and that they underappreciate the
importance of sample size relative to sample propor-
tions, we can derive expectations about how sample
size–based uncertainty will affect choices. First, since
sample size is an important determinant of option
uncertainty, we predict that people will, at least under
some circumstances, use sample size information. But
at the same time, studies have shown that sample size
is given little weight when it is pit against sample pro-
portion. Consequently, we expect differences in sam-
ple proportions to be an important moderator, with
the influence of sample size on choices being greatest
when proportions are relatively undiagnostic.
Overview of Experiments
In our paradigm, choice options are presented as
“wheels of fortune,” each with one blue and one red
segment. The premise is that one wheel will be spun
100 times, and a target of N blue outcomes must be
reached to win a payment. Participants make many
such choices and are paid only if the wheel they
choose reaches the target. Prior to each set of 100
spins, the participant is provided with a sample of
spins from both wheels. The samples vary in size and
performance—here, the proportion of blue outcomes.
In Study 1, we construct the samples to provide
a powerful test of sensitivity to sample size–based
uncertainty. We test whether people prefer small
sample options for stretch targets when observed
proportions are equal but large sample options for
below-average targets. We also test whether people
trade off differences in observed proportions with
sample size–based uncertainty and, if so, by how
much. In Study 2, we randomly generate samples and
use two different target levels to move toward a more
representative design (Brunswik 1955).
Study 1: Factorial Design
In Study 1, we employed a factorial design in which
the probability of reaching the target and the sam-
ple proportions of blue outcomes were varied orthog-
onally and the target was to reach at least 50 blue
results in 100 additional spins.
Methodology
Study 1 was conducted in a laboratory using com-
puters and a specially designed web browser–based
survey. The participants were 73 students from the
University of Warwick (44% female, Mage = 21093,
SDage = 2072) who were paid a £5 show-up fee plus £0025
each time they chose a wheel that reached the target. Up
to 22 participants worked simultaneously on the exper-
iment, each seated in an individual cubicle.
The generating mechanisms were spinning wheels
divided into “blue” and “red” segments; the proba-
bility of success on each trial was represented by the
size of the blue segment. All possible wheels with
segments ranging from 0% to 100% blue were graph-
ically presented on one screen, and participants were
asked to assume that each possible wheel was equally
likely to be chosen for the upcoming task. They were
then shown an example of a task in which the wheels
were revealed, along with the sample information.
The sample information was given as the number of
spins and the number of times the wheel came up
blue and red (see Figure 1(a)). In this example task,
the segment area and the sample drawn from the
wheel were chosen to highlight how the sample was
not identical to the underlying population: the wheel
having a blue segment covering 50% had come up
blue in 5 out of 14 spins. The next task was a practice
task, identical to the actual choice tasks, in which the
wheels were blanked out, and only the sample infor-
mation was provided (see Figure 1(b)). Participants
were told they would win money if and when the
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Figure 1 (Color online) Example of a Task Presented to Illustrate the Spinners (a) and One Actual Choice Task (b)
Notes. In the example of a task, wheels were revealed. In the actual choice tasks, wheels were covered and only the samples were visible.
wheel they chose reached a target of at least 50 blues
in the next 100 spins.
All participants faced the same nine tasks in ran-
dom order. In each task a small sample was provided
from one wheel and a large sample from the other.
The tasks are summarized in Table 1, which classi-
fies tasks according to two differences between the
large and small sample option. The first classification
is the sample proportions of blue outcomes, which we
denote as ãProp4S5 for the difference in sample propor-
tion of successes. The second classification is in terms
of probabilities of reaching the target of t = 50 in 100
spins, ãp4t5, or the difference in the probability of reach-
ing the target. Positive values of both ãProp4S5 and
ãp4t5 indicate an advantage for the small sample spin-
ner. We varied ãProp4S5 and ãp4t5 orthogonally, pro-
ducing a 3 (ãProp4S5: 10%, 0.0%, or −10%) × 3 (ãp4t5:
0.1, 0.0, or −001) design.
The three choices in the middle columns of Table 1
involve equal observed proportions, ãProp4S5 = 0%,
for stretch, average, and below-average targets. For
the other choices, trade-offs occur between differ-
ences in observed proportions and uncertainty. For
stretch targets and ãProp4S5 = −10%, higher uncer-
tainty compensates for lower observed proportions
Table 1 Design of Study 1
ãProp4S5= Proportion (S  Small5− Proportion (S  Large)
10% 0% −10%
ãp4t5= p4t  Small5− p4t  Large5: 0.1 0 −001 0.1 0 −001 0.1 0 −001
Target type: Below Below Below Stretch Average Below Stretch Stretch Stretch
Small sample No. of S 4 4 3 2 4 6 1 2 2
No. of F 2 2 1 6 4 2 3 6 4
Prop(S) 67% 67% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 25% 33%
p4t5 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.1 0.49 0.9 0.19 0.1 0.23
Large sample No. of S 17 30 21 9 18 27 12 10 15
No. of F 14 23 12 27 18 9 21 18 18
Prop(S) 55% 57% 64% 25% 50% 75% 36% 36% 45%
p4t5 0.67 0.77 0.91 0 0.48 1 0.08 0.09 0.31
Note. S, successes; F , fails.
for the most extreme negative deviation from the
target. Conversely, for below-average targets and
ãProp4S5 = 10%, lower uncertainty compensates for
lower observed proportions for the most extreme pos-
itive deviation from the target.
Results
Figure 2 displays the proportion of respondents
choosing the small sample option in each condition.
For ãProp4S5 = 0%, there was a tendency to choose
the option with the higher p4t5. For the stretch target,
most (63%) participants chose the small sample spin-
ner; for the below-average target, most (77%) chose
the large sample spinner (i.e., 23% chose the small
sample spinner). For the average target and when
both options had the same p4t5, only a minority chose
the small sample option (27%). No effect of ãp4t5 was
evident when ãProp4S5 was either +10% or −10%.
In these cases, participants always favored the option
with the higher sample proportion of successes.
Formal analyses confirmed these findings. Choices
for the small sample option were regressed onto the
z-standardized scores of ãProp4S5 and ãp4t5 and their
interaction using a logistic mixed effects model with
correlated random intercepts and slopes for every
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Figure 2 Proportion of Choices for the Small Sample Option as a
Function of the Differences in Observed Proportions of
Successes, ãProp4S5, and the Differences in the
Probabilities of Reaching the Target, ãp4t5
0
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
ΔProp (S ) = +10 ΔProp (S ) = 0
(%)
ΔProp (S) = –10
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Notes. Values of ãp4t5 and ãProp4S5 greater than zero indicate an advantage
for the small sample option. Error bars = indicate standard errors of the
mean.
participant in the lme4 package for the R statistical
software. Choices were sensitive to ãp4t5 ( = 0036,
z= 2090, p < 0001) and ãProp4S5 (= 1023, z= 5087, p <
00001). The interaction was not significant (z= −1007,
p= 0028). Directly testing whether ãp4t5 was relevant
only for ãProp4S5 = 0%, we contrasted the effect of
ãp4t5 for choices where ãProp4S5 was substantial (i.e.,
+10% or −10%, coded 0) with those where ãProp4S5
was zero (coded 1). The regression analysis revealed
the expected interaction (= 0084, z= 3076, p < 00001),
indicating that the influence of ãp4t5 was larger in
the absence of a difference in ãProp4S5 (= 1064, z=
3085, p < 00001) than in the presence of a difference
in ãProp4S5 of either +0010 or −0010 ( = −0003, z =
−0034, p= 0073).
Discussion
These results support the hypotheses that choices are
sensitive to the value created by sample size–based
uncertainty under some conditions. We found that
only when options did not differ in sample perfor-
mance, i.e., the proportion of hits, did respondents
prefer the small sample option for stretch targets and
the large sample option for below-average targets.
When the options differed in sample performance,
here by 10%, choices favored the option with the
higher observed performance, regardless of sample
size. Thus, choices did not reflect trade-offs between
the value of sample size–based uncertainty and dif-
ferences in sample performance. Sample size seems
to be used as a tie-breaker when sample performance
cannot distinguish between options.
One might ask how far these conclusions depend
on the assumed priors for the spinners. The ãp4t5 val-
ues in Table 1, on which we based our the factorial
design, are derived assuming a uniform distribution
over all possible spinners, or a Beta41115-distribution.
This is what we instructed our participants to assume.
If participants’ priors deviate a great deal from this
assumption, this could change the sign of ãp4t5. We
conducted simulations to determine the range of pri-
ors that (a) maintain the order of ãp4t5’s for each level
of ãProp4S5 and (b) maintain ãp4t5’s larger (smaller)
than zero for tasks where ãp4t5 is supposed to be +001
(−001). We varied the a and b parameters of the prior
Beta4a1 b5-distribution orthogonally from 0.001 to 150.
The results are illustrated in Figure 3, which gives
a simplified summary. The range of admissible prior
distributions given our design is highlighted in dark
grey shading. As can be seen, over a wide range of
possible prior distributions, the predictions of Study 1
remain unchanged.
Furthermore, the choice pattern cannot be read-
ily explained by assuming prior beliefs outside the
admissible range. Calculating ãp4t5 values assuming
that spinners with extremely small (or large) success
segments were highly likely results in the prediction
that the large (or small) sample options would have
always had the higher chance of reaching the target.
Contrary to this, we do not observe an overall pref-
erence for large or small sample options. Calculating
ãp4t5 values assuming highly peaked prior distribu-
tions, ãp4t5 values favor the large sample options
for below-average targets, i.e., tasks with ãProp4S5 =
10%, and the small sample options for stretch targets,
i.e., tasks with Prop4S5 = −10%. This is opposite to
the observed choice pattern. For ãProp4S5 = 0%, the
sign and order of ãp4t5 values remain unchanged.
Thus, ãp4t5 would still account for this choice pat-
tern. Importantly, concluding that choices are sensi-
tive to sample size–based uncertainty for ãProp4S5=
0% and insensitive for ãProp4S5 6= 0% is valid for a
wide range of prior beliefs about the likelihood of
possible spinners, and prior beliefs outside this range
seem unlikely.
One limitation of Study 1 is that choice patterns
might have been due to the particular set of nine
tasks. In particular, it remains unclear whether dif-
ferences in observed proportions smaller than 10%
would elicit trade-offs with sample size–based uncer-
tainty. Additionally, we cannot generalize beyond the
specific target level of 50 successes in 100 spins,
which is arguably special in that it represents the
notion of chance. In Study 2 we generalized and repli-
cated our results by randomly generating choice tasks
and adding a more extreme target (80 successes in
100 spins).
Study 2: Random Generation of
Choice Tasks
In Study 2, we investigated the sensitivity to sam-
ple size–based uncertainty across a more varied set of
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Figure 3 Range of a and b Parameters of a Beta4a1 b5-Distribution
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Notes. Dark grey shading indicate prior distributions that maintain the order and sign of ãp4t5 values compared with the factorial design; cf. Table 1. Plots
illustrate the most extreme admissible right-skewed (Beta40005115), left-skewed (Beta41028100055), and peaked (Beta49049190495) prior density distributions. Dotted lines
indicate assume flat prior distribution.
choice tasks. For every task, we randomly generated a
large and a small sample option and randomly chose
the target to be either 50 or 80 successes out of 100
spins of the wheel.
Methodology
Study 2 was conducted in the same laboratory as
Study 1 using similar methods. One hundred sev-
enteen University of Warwick students (65 female,
Mage = 21067, SDage = 3091) were recruited based on
a £5 show-up fee plus £0025 each time an option
they chose met or exceeded a target. Instructions were
identical to those in Study 1.
To generate the stimuli for each trial, we randomly
drew four random numbers: (1) a number between
1 and 10 that represented the blue outcomes in sam-
ple 1, (2) a number between 1 and 10 that represented
the red outcomes in sample 1, and (3) and (4) differ-
ent numbers between 1 and 50 that represented the
number of blue and red outcomes in sample 2. Typ-
ically, sample 1 (ranging from 2 to 20 observations)
was the small sample, and sample 2 (ranging from 2
to 50) was the large one, although only sample size
and composition were entered into the analysis. The
resulting proportions lay between 5% and 95% for the
small samples and between 2% and 98% for the large
samples. For each task we also randomly chose a tar-
get of either 50 blue or 80 blue outcomes.
All participants made 13 choices. The first
12 involved choices randomly generated as just
described. The final choice ensured enough responses
to replicate the finding from Study 1 that for equal
sample proportions people preferred the small sam-
ple when striving for a stretch target. For this 13th
choice, the small sample spinner had produced 2
blue and 2 red outcomes and the large sample spin-
ner had produced 34 blue and 34 red outcomes (i.e.,
ãProp4S5 = 0). With a target of 80, this creates 6%
advantage for the small sample option (i.e., ãp4t5 =
0006). After all choices, participants were given feed-
back and informed about how much money they
had won.
Characteristics of Randomly Generated
Choice Tasks
For the 1,404 observed choices (117 participants × 12
choices), the average sample sizes were 10.75 (SD =
4004) for the small and 51.12 (SD = 20022) for the
large sample spinners. The average absolute differ-
ence between sample proportions, ãProp4S5, was
25% (SD = 19). The average ãp4t5 was 0.30 (SD =
0030) combining both targets, 0.43 (SD = 0030) for the
target of 50, and 0.16 (SD = 0024) for the target of 80.
The average likelihood of reaching the target if the
option with the higher p4t5 was chosen on each trial
was 0.71 when the target was 50 and 0.17 when it
was 80.
As visible from the scatterplot in Figure 4, ãProp4S5
and ãp4t5 were strongly and positively correlated
across choice tasks. A regression analysis confirmed
this relationship (= 3001, t4114005= 44028, p < 00001)
and showed it to be moderated by the target level
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Figure 4 Scatterplot and Regression Lines of the 1,404 Choice Tasks
Used in the Representative Design of Study 2 Relating
ãProp4S5 and ãp4t5
–100 –50 0 50 100
–1.0
–0.5
0
0.5
1.0
∆Prop (S ) (%)
∆
p
(t
)
Notes. Circles and the solid line indicate tasks with the target of 50 blue
outcomes. Crosses and the dotted line indicate tasks with the target of 80
blue outcomes. Dark symbols refer to tasks with a ãProp4S5 less than 10%.
(= −0003, t4114005= −28066, p < 00001). The relation-
ship was weaker for the target of 80 (= 0067, t46825=
27088, p < 00001) than for the target of 50 ( = 1057,
t47185= 77048, p < 00001).
Despite the strong relationship between ãProp4S5
and ãp4t5, in 15% of trials the option with the higher
p4t5 did not have the higher Prop4S5. These critical
trials, where sample size information should be deci-
sive, are located in the top left and bottom right quad-
rants of the scatterplot. When the target was 80, 22%
of cases were critical; when it was 50, 9% were. If we
focus only on cases where ãProp4S5 is less than 10%,
these critical cases are even more prevalent, making
up 34% overall and 42% of cases involving the target
of 80.
Experimental Results
We regressed the 12 choices made within the repre-
sentative design on ãProp4S5, ãp4t5, and the target
level t. Choices were coded 1 for choices of the small
sample option and 0 otherwise. We conducted a logis-
tic mixed effects regression analysis with correlated
random intercepts and slopes for every participant
using the lme4 package for the R statistical software.
We used z-standardized scores and included all inter-
actions.
As in Study 1, choices were sensitive to ãp4t5 (=
1089, z = 2039, p = 00017), over and above sensitiv-
ity to ãProp4S5 ( = 4052, z = 7015, p < 00001). An
unexpected interaction between ãProp4S5 and the tar-
get level ( = 1058, z = 2054, p = 00011) indicated that
ãProp4S5 predicted choices better when the target was
80 rather than 50. No other effect was significant;
z < 0083. Analyzing the 13th choice (ãProp4S5 = 0%,
Figure 5 Proportion of Choices, of the 333 Critical Choice Tasks, That
Favored the Higher p4t5 Option as a Function of the Absolute
Difference in Observed Proportions, ãProp4S5
0
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Note. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
target = 80) also revealed sensitivity to sample size–
based uncertainty with 60.7% of participants choosing
the small sample option (2415= 5034, p= 00002).
We next explored whether the size of differences
in observed proportions moderated the impact of
sample size–based uncertainty. To this end, we only
analyzed choices for trials on which sample size was
decisive either because the difference in observed pro-
portions pointed toward the option with the lower
likelihood of reaching the target or because the differ-
ence was zero. This analysis included 216 tasks from
the representative design and 117 from the 13th task.
As shown in Figure 5, the proportion of choices in
line with ãp4t5 rather than ãProp4S5 decreased as the
size of the absolute difference in ãProp4S5 increased.
In fact, in these critical trials, choices tended to follow
ãp4t5 only when ãProp4S5 was zero.
Discussion
These results generalize those of Study 1 to a random
selection of choice tasks. Again, choices tended to fol-
low differences in sample proportions while neglect-
ing sample size. Only when the difference in sample
proportions was zero were choices sensitive to sample
size–based uncertainty and tended toward the options
with the higher probability of reaching the target.
It appears that trading off even small differences in
observed performance with the value of uncertainty
is a hard task to master.
Conclusion
In two experiments, we investigated whether people
maximize their chances of reaching performance tar-
gets by integrating option uncertainty—here, sample
size—with sample performance—here, the proportion
of positive outcomes in that sample. Our evidence
suggests sensitivity to the value of uncertainty only
when the differences in sample performance are vir-
tually zero. When those differences are zero, peo-
ple responded to sample size appropriately: for
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below-average targets they preferred the large sample
option, whereas for stretch targets they preferred the
small sample option.
Why are people insensitive to sample sized–based
uncertainty, even though they recognize that sample
size matters? We tentatively suggest two explanations.
First, sample size information is logically subservient
to performance information. Knowing that a sample
of size N has been obtained from a population is not
useful at all unless more is specified about the perfor-
mance of that sample. On the other hand, knowing
that a sample revealed a performance p is useful even
if the sample size is unknown. As a consequence, the
interpretation of sample performance might take pri-
ority over that of sample size that, indeed, may never
be used. Second, forgoing a better option for a worse
but more uncertain one might be hard to justify. Hav-
ing chosen an employee because we did not know
much about her is a difficult argument to make, espe-
cially if the employee underperforms. By contrast, if
we choose the candidate who looks better “on paper,”
it is hard to argue that the wrong choice procedure
was followed. Without the reasoning provided in this
paper, relative uncertainty might remain an intangible
basis for choice, which cannot easily be pointed to. It
is no accident that we rarely hear people say, “better
the devil you don’t know.”
Griffin and Tversky (1992) reached a similar conclu-
sion, studying the advantages large samples should
have on making judgments more precise. They
showed that what they call evidence strength, which
for us would be the sample proportion, was more
important than evidence weight, which for us would
be sample size. We show that people also underes-
timate the advantages of small samples, when small
samples have a value advantage. The overall message
appears to be that the implications of sample size are
generally underappreciated and that people focus pri-
marily on the central tendency of samples as a guide
to judgment and decision making, and they will use
sample size information as a tie-breaker.
Our studies add to the literature on ambiguity aver-
sion. As often portrayed, when faced with a choice
between an option having a known probability and
an option having a completely unknown or ambigu-
ous probability, people prefer to choose the known
option (Ellsberg 1961). This might seem like a bias,
since in the settings that were discussed by Ellsberg
and that have been the focus of much subsequent
research, ambiguous and risky options have the same
expected outcome. In line with earlier work (Rode
et al. 1999), we show that to achieve a target, ambigu-
ous options are sometimes objectively better than
unambiguous ones for stretch targets and sometimes
worse for below-average targets. This might explain
documented reversals of ambiguity aversion for low
probability gains and high probability losses, both sit-
uations arguably involving stretch targets (Curley and
Yates 1985, 1989; Hogarth and Einhorn 1990; Kahn
and Sarin 1988).
Furthermore, the present research on the role of
small samples in reaching absolute performance tar-
gets complements research on the role of small
samples for reaching “relative” performance targets.
Faced with a choice between two uncertain options,
existing performance differences are systematically
inflated in small samples (Kareev 2000). If decision
makers have a stretch target for performance differ-
ences before making a choice, small samples increase
choice quality (Cahan 2010, Fiedler and Kareev 2006).
Thus, not only for absolute but also for relative per-
formance targets can less be more, but only when the
odds of reaching the target are against the decision
maker—when they are not, less is less.
Finally, the two-sided finding that value generated
by uncertainty only affects choices under very nar-
row conditions seems to resonate with organizational
behavior and managerial decision making. Point-
ing toward sensitivity, sample size–based uncertainty
seems to play a role in the considerations of indi-
vidual team members (Kareev and Avrahami 2007).
If competitive bonuses are based on large samples
of their performance history, motivation to improve
will be limited for both, those routinely above aver-
age and those routinely below. When based on more
uncertain small samples, effort is necessary on every
task and all the time, increasing overall performance.
Similarly, in their classic review of managerial risk
taking, March and Shapira (1987) report that “most
managers seem to feel that risk taking is more war-
ranted when faced with failure to meet targets than
when targets were secure. In ‘bad’ situations risks
would be taken” (p. 1409). Experiments with man-
agers support this claim (Laughhunn et al. 1980) as
do measures of firm performance. Firms below the
industry’s median show higher variability on returns
on investment, presumably reflecting the adoption
of more uncertain strategies when below the stretch
target of the industry benchmark (Fiegenbaum and
Thomas 1988). Yet only sometimes do young work-
ers receive risk premiums when it seems they should
(Bollinger and Hotchkiss 2003, Burgess et al. 1998,
Hendricks et al. 2003, Lazear 1995).
Our evidence is limited to a paradigm with binary
outcomes and a gambling task. Although we expect
our findings to be robust, this should be investigated
in other settings. It is also important to know whether
feedback or statistical literacy improve performance.
In our paradigm, participants did not receive feed-
back about their performance until the end and
were thus prevented from optimizing their behavior.
Because differences in probabilities of exceeding the
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target are in the single digits, extensive training might
be necessary to optimize choices. Also, in our stud-
ies we did not include measures of statistical literacy,
which might influence acknowledgement of sample
size implications. In our studies, proxies for statisti-
cal literacy, such as the highest degree or the type
of degree, did not enter significantly into any of our
analyses.
To conclude, it has become a common observation
that important decisions involve uncertainty about
their outcomes. The result might be a focus on the
observed performance of one’s options. To use the
words of Dixit and Nalebuff (1991, p. 169), “Even
though you can’t guess right all the time, you can at
least recognize the odds.” Here, we suggest that an
exclusive focus on observed odds can be detrimental.
Going beyond notions of more-is-better and less-is-
more, we show that the appropriate answer depends
on where we stand. Knowing more about an option
adds value when the odds are favorable. When the
odds are against us, we are often better off with the
devil we don’t know than the devil we do.
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Appendix A
Here, we illustrate how uncertainty combines with
observed performance in the presence of performance tar-
gets to create value. Imagine a decision maker faced with
two urns and a performance target (t) to be met or exceeded
in the next 100 draws with replacement. Each urn contains
100 balls of two colors, one corresponding to successes (S)
and the other to failures (F ). The known (K) urn contains
50 S and 50 F balls; the unknown (U ) urn can contain any
number of S balls from 0 to 100, where S was drawn from
a uniform distribution. The K urn is the urn analogue to
Derring Do or the seasoned job applicant from our intro-
duction; the U urn is the analogue of Dark Knocks or the
new graduate.
To illustrate the effects of sample size, assume we start
with two U urns. A sample of 6 balls is drawn from one
urn and 10 from the other, and both samples reveal a 50/50
distribution of S and F balls. We denote the two urns by
U3/3 and U5/5, respectively. For both urns all possible com-
binations, except 0 and 100 S balls, are still possible. Yet
based on those samples, they are no longer equally likely.
Both samples indicate that the modal composition is 50 S
and 50 F balls, and the expected performance of a single
draw is at p4S5 = 005 for both urns. At the same time, the
posterior distribution associated with the U3/3 urn is more
spread out.
Formally stated, the probability of reaching a given target
with a US/F urn can be calculated by the weighted aver-
age of the decumulative Binomial distribution for each pos-
sible urn, where weights are the urns’ posterior densities
Figure A.1 Probability Distributions of Reaching Targets for Urns
with an Expected Performance of p4S5= 0050 and
p4S5= 0033, and Different Amounts of Prior Information
as Illustrated in Sample Sizes of 0 (U), 3 (U 1/2),
6 (U 3/3), 10 (U 5/5), and  (K 50/50)
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based on the sample, Beta4S+11 F+15. Figure A.1 shows the cor-
responding posterior probability distributions of achieving
different targets for five urns: a U urn with no sample, a K
urn with a known composition of 50 S balls, and three urns
about which there is sample information, a U1/2 urn and
the U3/3 and U5/5 urns. For every target above the expected
performance of 0.50, with the exception of the U1/2 urn,
the probability of reaching the target is higher for smaller
samples. Figure A.1 also shows how uncertainty resulting
from small samples can compensate for a lower observed
performance. The U1/2 urn with a p4S5 = 0033 has a higher
likelihood of achieving stretch targets—here, t > 62—than
the U5/5 urn.
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